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ABSTRACT
Mixed IPv4/IPv6 networks will continue to use mobility support 
over tunneling mechanisms for a long period of time until the 
establishment of IPv6 end-to-end connectivity. Encapsulating 
IPv6 traffi c within IPv4 increases the level of hiding internal 
contents. Thus, mobility in mixed IPv4/IPv6 networks 
introduces new security vulnerabilities. One of the most critical 
vulnerabilities associated with the IPv6 protocol is the routing 
header that potentially may be used by attackers to bypass the 
network security devices. This paper proposes an algorithm 
(V6HAPA) for protecting home agent clients from the routing 
header vulnerability, considering that the home agents reside 
behind an IPv4 Network Address Translation (NAT) router. The 
experimental results show that the V6HAPA provides enough 
confi dence to protect the home agent clients from attackers. 
Keywords: Mobile IP, IPv4/IPv6 coexistence, IPv6 security, IPv6 
routing header.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless technologies are being more widely applied today across the world 
in various fi elds of sciences and industries. This trend is triggered by the needs 
of a huge number of users and devices in utilizing the Internet communication 
services. It is expected to continue unabatedly accompanied with the need of 
having numerous amounts of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The increasing 
demand of IP addresses has been exposing the shortage of the current IPv4 
address space. The next generation IPv6 protocol is developed by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) to overcome the shortage of the IP addresses. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to migrate from IPv4 to IPv6 in the near future 
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due to the fact that many users and networks are still using IPv4 (Barker, 
2013). Thus, the transition should be done gradually, as such, IPv6 will coexist 
with its precedence version IPv4 for a long period of time until the Internet is 
fully migrated to IPv6 (Hong, 2013;  Bi, Deng, Xu, Shi, & Hu, 2013). Various 
transition mechanisms  have been defi ned such as dual-stack, translation, and 
tunneling to support the interoperability between mixed IP networks (Amoss 
& Minoli, 2008).
Mobile Internet Protocol Overview 
Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) is the most well-known macro mobility 
scheme that solves the problem of node mobility by redirecting the traffi c for 
a mobile node (MN) to its current location. MIP is an open standard protocol 
designed by the IETF to allow users to move from one network to another 
while maintains their own permanent IP addresses (Perkins, 1996). 
Routing system in IP networks  is based on fi xed IP addresses and analogous 
to a postal letter delivery system (Taylor, Waung & Banan, 1997). Once the 
MN moves away from its home network, it is no longer reachable by using 
normal IP routing. The MN asks its home post offi ce to forward the mail to 
its new attached network through the local post offi ce there. Thus, when the 
MN leaves its home network and moves to another network, it uses the same 
IP address while moving over a different network. Therefore, MIP ensures 
that a moving individual can maintain its communication without sessions or 
connections being dropped.  
 
MIP which is based on the Internet Protocol (IP) is more scalable for the 
Internet and offers wide connectivity for users, whether they are moving 
within their home network or traveling away from home crossing multiple 
Local Area Networks (LANs) confi gured with different IP address systems. 
Mobility support and its solutions are described in details in (Perkins, 2002; 
Arkko, Perkins & Johnson,  2011). 
Security of MIP has always been of a high concern in any internetworking 
environment. Moreover, it is signifi cance to be implemented in dual stack 
IPv4/IPv6 networks, since there is no compatibility between both protocols 
(Ahmadi, 2012).  
SECURITY CONCERNS IN MIXED IP NETWORKS
Throughout the transition period, the movement of the MNs among networks 
that confi gured with different IP protocols is inevitable (Lee, Jung, Lee, Lee & 
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Han, 2013). As a result, many researchers have shown interests in proposing 
new systems that address the issue of IPv4 and IPv6 coexistence with mobility 
support.
Several studies have investigated security concerns and implications of 
MIP such as (Convery & Miller, 2004; Durdağı & Buldu, 2010; La Polla, 
Martinelli, & Sgandurra, 2013; Zagar, Grgic, & Rimac-Drlje, 2007). However, 
the security concerns of both MIP protocols (i.e., MIPv4 and MIPv6) have 
been considered separately since their designing period, and a little attention 
has been given to these protocols in mixed IPv4/IPv6 environment.
Shanmugaraja and Chandrasekar (2012) discuss some security issues of 
IPv4 and IPv6 as well as analyze different security threats that may emerge 
due to implementation of various transition mechanisms. The most critical 
vulnerability related to IPv6 extension headers was identifi ed in a research 
work by Savola (2002). This vulnerability can occur due to the exploitation 
of the IPv6 RH feature which has been demonstrated and analyzed in many 
recent studies (Durdağı & Buldu, 2010; Frankel, Graveman, Pearce, & Rooks, 
2010; Karthikeyan & Prittopaul, 2013). According to the IPv6 specifi cation 
(Deering & Hinden, 1998), all nodes that support IPv6 must be able to process 
IPv6 RHs. On the other hand, such vulnerability can be used by attackers to 
bypass network security through avoiding access control lists on destination 
addresses (Biondi & Ebalard, 2007).  In this concern, Abley, Savola, & Neville-
Neil (2007) suggest that the fi rewall policy must block forwarding packets 
with type 0 RHs (RH0) and permit other types of RHs to pass through. Blocking 
all IPv6 packets containing RHs is, however, not a worthy solution as this 
could have serious implications for the IPv6 future development. Recently, 
most of fi rewall policies block all packets containing RH0. In addition, 
the default fi rewall confi guration prevents the forwarding of IPv6 traffi c 
with RH0.
Moreover, IPv6 packets channeled through Teredo tunnel is not subjected to a 
deep traffi c inspection process, because the packets are encapsulated into IPv4 
packets (Krishna n, Hoagland, & Thaler, 2011). Therefore, Teredo tunnel allows 
inbound access from the Internet to the devices located behind NAT router. 
As a consequence, the use of IPv6 RH in different IP networks may increase 
the vulnerability of IPv4 networks. It is due to the fact that IPv4 security 
devices, such as fi rewalls, are not able to inspect IPv6 header encapsulated 
in IPv4 packet. Thus, proposing new security mechanisms that consider 
the vulnerability of IPv6 RH are crucial to secure the communications between 
different IP networks.
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Vulnerability of Using IPv6 Routing Header
The RH functionality which is originally provided by IPv6 can be used to 
list one or more intermediate nodes to be visited on the way to a packet’s 
destination. At the same time, it can be exploited by the attackers to bypass 
the traffi c fi ltering mechanism and generate a Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
(Abley et al., 2007; Convery & Miller, 2004; Wadhwa & Khari, 2011) .
Having done packet inception using Man-In-The-Middle technique, an 
attacker can exploit the RH in order to generate malicious packets which are 
performed through specifying a victim node’s IP address in the RH. These 
kinds of packets will be routed through a public accessible IP address (e.g., 
network server) and some intermediate nodes to be fi nally delivered to the 
victim host. Certainly, the malicious packets will be going through a checking 
process in the server of the intended network. However, without checking 
whether the IP addresses are trusted or not the server forwards these packets 
based on the IP addresses specifi ed in the RH. Thus, the malicious packets will 
reach the victim host without breaking any of security policies as illustrated 
in Figure 1.
This vulnerability results in such case: with every new attachment of an MN 
to an IPv6 network, all the clients of its Home Agent (HA) would become 
susceptible to attacks.  Consequently, all packets which are received and 
passed through the HA must be subjected to a deep inspection process.
Figure 1. Routing header attack
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IPV6 HOME AGENT PROTECTION ALGORITHM (V6HAPA)
This paper proposes an algorithm (V6HAPA) that works once an IPv6 address 
has been activated on the HA or on one of its clients. The main purpose of 
implementing this algorithm is to deny packets with spoofed addresses 
accessing the home network, and to allow the trustable packets to reach its 
correct destinations. 
Once an IPv6 packet arrives at HA, it is subjected to the rules of fi ltration 
process. In case of a packet does not match the rules, then the algorithm 
discards the packet. Otherwise, the packet is checked regarding the value of 
the next header (NH). If this value is not equal 43 (i.e., the following header is 
not RH), then the algorithm accepts the packet. If the value is equal 43 then, 
the type of IPv6 RH is checked either it is 0 type or not. If a type 0 of IPv6 RH 
exists, then the algorithm checks the value of IPv6 RH Segment Left (RHSL) 
whether it is 0 or not. If it is equal to 0 then accept the packet. Otherwise, check 
the currently fi rst destination RH (DstRH). As a result, the packet is discarded 
if its address does not match the assigned fi ltration rules (i.e., the DstRH is not 
found in the Authorized_IPv6RH list). In case of matching, the current DstRH 
is interchangeable with the address of the next one, and at the same time, the 
value of RHSL is decremented by one. The interchangeability and matching 
processes are repeated until the RHSL value becomes zero.
On the other hand, if the type of IPv6 RH is not equal 0, then the algorithm 
checks whether the RH type is not equal 2 and then discards the packet. 
Otherwise, the algorithm checks the RHSL. In case the value of RHSL is greater 
than 1, the algorithm simply discards the packet. Otherwise, the embedded 
DstRH IP address inside the packet is checked and if it is found in the IPv6CoA_
cache table, then the algorithm accepts the packet. If the IPv6 DstRH IP address 
is not found in the list, the packet would be silently discarded. In case the RHSL 
is equal 0, the algorithm accepts the packet. Figure 2 presents the details of 
the V6HAPA.
The fi ltration process of the packets containing RHs is basically based on two 
essential lists: 
a) The Authori zed_IPv6RH list, is mainly concerned with the packets of 
RH0. Packets of this type will be denied unless all the destination RH 
addresses are matched with the entries inside the list.
b) The IPv6CoA_cache is concerned with the packets of RH2. The 
V6HAPA algorithm accepts these packets as long as the embedded RH 
destination IP addresses of the received packet matches the IP addresses 
in this list. In case of having a packet with RHSL greater than zero, then 
it is silently discarded.
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 V6HAPA  Algorithm
1:     // Packet (pkt) arrival & decapsulation process
2:    // Matching pkt with the fi ltration rules
3: for each pkt do the following:
4:     if   srcIP does not match the fi ltering rules then5:         discard  pkt
6:     // Check the IPv6 Next Header (NH) whether consists of RH 
or not
7:     else if   the NH value ≠ 43 then
8:         accept pkt
9:     // Check the type of routing header (RH)
10:     else if   the RH = type 0 then
11:         temp = RHSL12:         while (RHSL > 0){13:         // Check the fi rst Destination Routing Header (DstRH)14:             if the DstRH does not match with the fi ltering rules 
then
15:                  discard  pkt
16:                  exit 
17:             else{
18:              // Perform replacement process
19:                   swap (( temp – RHSL ) + 1) , current DstRH)20:                   RHSL -- // the value RHSL is decreased by 1 21:         } // End of while
22:         accept pkt
23:         Exit
24:     else if the RH ≠ type 2
25:         // In case the type of RH ≠ “type 2”                               
26:         discard  pkt
27:         Exit
28:        // Check the value of SL
29:     Else
30:          If RHSL = 031:               accept pkt  
32:          else if RHSL = 133:             // Check the IPv6 DstRH with the IPv6CoA cache34:                    If the DstRH is matched then35:                         accept pkt
36:                         Exit
37:                    else discard  pkt
38:                         Exit
39:          Else
40:               discard  pkt
41:               exit
Figure 2. V6HAPA Algorithm
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the functionality of the V6HAPA algorithm, two metrics 
are considered: (a) the performance and (b) the accuracy. The equations that 
calculate the accuracy of preventing suspicious IPv6 packets with RH are 
given in Equation (1) and Equation (2) (Osareh & Shadgar, 2008).
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                                    (2)
The detected suspicious and non-suspicious packets in V6HAPA algorithm 
can be categorized as follows:
 True Positive (TP): the situation in which the actual attack is detected 
as an attack.
 True Negative (TN): the situation in which the actual normal is detected 
as a normal.
 False Positive (FP): the situation in which the actual normal is detected 
as attack.
 False Negative (FN): the situation in which the actual attack is detected 
as normal.
In this paper, the false positive is defi ned as the situation in which the actual 
normal packet is detected as an attack. False positive occurres because the 
proposed algorithm rejects all the suspicious packets (i.e., malicious and 
normal packets) carrying unmatched IPv6 routing header addresses.
The fi ltration process (matched/unmatched) of the packets containing routing 
header is confi gured by the network administrator. Possibly, some of the 
rejected packets by V6HAPA were not harmful and also do not intend to 
attack the network. However, the V6HAPA rejects all packets (malicious and 
normal packets) carrying routing header due to  IPv6 routing header addresses 
in those rejected packets do not match the assigned fi ltration rules in the 
Authorized_IPv6RH list. Hence, some of the normal packets carrying IPv6 
routing header will be rejected. As a result, the accuracy was not 100%  and 
false positives are recorded during the experiment
Experimental Testbed Topology
The testbed topology has three components as follows (See Figure 3). 
a)  IPv6 traffi c emulator is designed to generate realistic IPv6 packets 
including RH0 and RH2 that are used to evaluate the performance of 
the V6HAPA algorithm. We can emulate several CNs simultaneously 
send packet to a MN stay behind NAT router
b)   V6HAPA module in home network implemented in the HA. This module 
receives the packets sent through the NAT router and then processes 
these packets according to the V6HAPA algorithm. 
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c) HA clients act as MNs moved in into IPv4 only network with NAT. This 
HA clients are having connection with outsiders and obtaining IPv6 
addresses from Teredo server.
Figure 3. Testbed Topology
Table 1 shows the hardware specifi cations and the confi guration settings for 
the undertaking experiment. 
Table 1







Linux Fedora 13 Linux Fedora 13 Windows 7
PC manufacturer Acer® PC Acer® PC Dell® PC
Processor Intel® Core™ 2 CPU, 
E4500 @ 2.20GHz
Intel® Core™ 2 CPU, 
E4500 @ 2.20GHz
Intel® Core™ 2 CPU, 
E4500 @ 2.20GHz
RAM 2 GB 2 GB 4 GB
Implementation Scapy 2.2.0 , Python C programming language Confi guration
Traffi c 
Monitoring tool
Scapy sniffi ng function Wireshark, Scapy sniffi ng 
function










































The experiments exhibit the ability of the V6HAPA algorithm in protecting 
the networks from the attackers who have exploited the IPv6 RH function as 
well as demonstrate the performance in term of processing time and accuracy.
For all experiments, the IPv6 RH has been classifi ed into 5 categories: RH0 
[5], RH0 [10], RH0 [15], RH0 [20] and RH0 [24]. The number in the brackets 
indicate the number of IPv6 destination addressess inluded in the RH. This 
classifi cation is designed to be consistent with the number of the IPv6 
destination addresses in each RH (i.e., the number of IP destination addresses 
in each RH could be at most 24 IP addresses).
The Scenarios 
First, we consider the experiments for evaluating the performance (in term of 
packet fi ltering time) of the V6HAPA algorithm to detect suspicious packets 
containing RH0 and its accuracy in fi ltering such packets without disturbing 
normal packets containing the same headers. To this end, the Abley et al., 
(2007) suggestions are employed. However, this trend has raised another 
implication in the accuracy aspect. It may prohibit the forwarding of normal 
packets containing RH0. 
Scenario 1: multiple CNs send IPv6 packets containing 50% normal packets 
and 50% suspicious packets. Table 2 shows the details regarding the RH type 
and size. For each RH type we conducted 10 runs in the experiment, starting 
with 500 packets up to 5000 packets with 500 packets increament. Thus, 
totally we experiment with overall of 27500 packets.
Scenario 2: Five CNs are emulated to craft and send simultaneously 5000 
IPv6 packets to the HA. Three CNs send IPv6 packets containing RH0, while 
the rest send packets without RH0. According to Field (2009) the majority of 
observations should be at least 60% of the population as a normal packets. 
Hence, in this paper 70% normal packets (i.e., packets without RH0) and 30% 
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malicious (packets that include RH0) are considered to be the representative 
of the majority of the packets. The packets which include RH0 are distributed 
as follows: 
Table 2 
Traffi c Data Type and Size for Scenario
No RH type RH size
Test 1 RH0[5] 88 bytes
Test 2 RH0[10] 168 bytes
Test 3 RH0[15] 248  bytes
Test 4 RH0[20] 328 bytes
Test 5 RH0[24] 392 bytes
(1) 20% of the packets have matched IP destination addresses with the 
identifi ed list (Authorized_IPv6RH), and (2) 10% of those packets have 
unmatched IP destination addresses (i.e., Suspicious packets) in the RH. The 
unmatched packets are divided into 7% malicious packets and 3% normal 
packets (see Table 3). 
We conduct an experiment for this scenario, and the results  have been 
subsequently used to calculate the accuracy of the V6HAPA algorithm in 
terms of preventing the HA from RH0 vulnerability using Equation (1) and 
Equation (2).
Table 3
Traffi c Data Classifi cation for Scenario 2
No Classifi cation RH type No. of packets Percentage of 
packets %
1 Normal packets without RH 3500 pkts 70%
2 Packets containing RH0 
(matched packet)
RH0[5] 1000 pkts 20%
3 Suspicious packets 
containing RH0 (malicious 
packet)
RH0[5] 350 pkts 7% (out of 10%)
4 Suspicious packets 
containing RH0 (normal 
packet)
RH0[5] 150 pkts 3% (out of 10%)
87
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Secondly, we consider the experiment for evaluating the performance and 
accuracy of the V6HAPA algorithm to detect suspicious packets containing 
RH2.
Scenario 3: Five CNs are emulated to send IPv6 packets to HA clients through 
NAT and V6HAPA module in HA. The CNs are  divided into three sets. The 
fi rst set has two nodes which are intended to generate and send suspicious 
packets with RH2 (containing unregistered IPv6 destination address). The 
second set contains two nodes that generate and send packets without RH2. 
The last set represents an authorized CN which intends to generate packets 
containing RH2 with valid IPv6 destination address. The generated packets 
sent by the authorized CN are specifi ed with only one RH destination IP address 
per packet. The embedded IP addresses within the RH2 must be matched with 
the home address of the MN that has already stored in the IPv6CoA_cache. 
Further details of the data experiment for this scenario are given in Table 4. 
Total number of packets is 5000.
Table 4
Traffi c Data Classifi cation for Scenario 3




without RH 3500 pkts 70%
2 Packets containing RH2 (only 1 
matched RH Dest IP Address) Se
t 3
RH2 1000 pkts 20%
3 Suspicious packets containing 1 
unmatched RH Dest IP address 
(normal packets) Se
t 1
RH2 100 pkts 2% (out of 
10%)
4 Suspicious packets containing 1 
unmatched RH Dest IP address 
(malicious packet) Se
t 1
RH2 100 pkts 2% (out of 
10%)
5 Packets containing more than 1 




100 pkts 2% (out of 
10%)
6 Suspicious packets containing 
more than 1 unmatched RH Dest 




100 pkts 2% (out of 
10%)
7 Suspicious packets containing 
more than 1 unmatched RH Dest 
IP address RH2 (malicious packet) S
et
 1 RH2[2]-RH2[24]
100 pkts 2% (out of 
10%)
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 4 shows the fi lter processing time in seconds versus the number of RH 
IPv6 addresses and the number of IPv6 packets sent (using the data in Scenario 
1). For 1000 IPv6 packets containing up to 24 IPv6 destination addresses (i.e., 
RH0 [24]), the processing time is 29 seconds. For 5000 IPv6 packets of the 
same RH0 classifi cation, the processing time increases to 139 seconds. It can 
be noticed that there is a signifi cant increase in the packet fi ltering time when 
the number of packets increases.
Figure 4. Filter Processing Time vs. Number of IPv6 Packets with RH0 
[5]-[24]
Figure 5 shows the fi ltration processing time consumed in fi ltering 5000 
packets according to the settings of the Scenario 2. From Figure 5, it can 
be noticed that there are three levels of the aggregation points indicated by 
three arrows. From bottom to top, the fi rst arrow refers to the time that is 
consumed in fi ltering around 3500 packets without RHs. The second arrow 
refers to the time that is consumed in fi ltering around 500 suspicious packets 
with RHs. The last arrow refers to the time that is spent in fi ltering around 
1000 matched packets with RHs. It is obvious that the fi ltration time for the 
suspicious packets is less than the time consumed by the RH matched packets. 
However, the time of fi ltration for packets without RHs is less than the time 
consumed by the suspicious packets. The rationale behind this observation is 
that the fi ltration process for matched packets continues until the last RH IP 
89
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address while in case of unmatched packets the fi ltering process stops when at 
least one of those IP addresses does not match with the IP addresses in the list. 
Hence, it can be concluded that this algorithm performs better considering the 
time required for fi ltering the unmatched packets.
Figure 5. Three Levels of Aggregation Points Represent Different Types of 
RH0
Experimental results of Scenario 3 is shown in Figure 6. The  results show that 
the V6HAPA algorithm has the highest accuracy compared to that recorded 
with the existing fi rewall policies (confi gured at the IPv4 only network in 
Figure 2). In false positive rates, the total number of normal packets, involving 
RHs, which are recognized as suspicious packets, is taken into consideration. 
From Figure 6, it can be clearly seen that the false positive rates will increase 
even more if the number of suspicions packets increases. Also, the results 
indicate that the V6HAPA algorithm is more accurate than the existing fi rewall 
policies.
The experimental results for the time spent in fi ltering packets containing RH2 
for V6HAPA algorithm are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. These two fi gures 
also show the fi ltering time per packet for the same scenario without security 
consideration. The V6HAPA algorithm affects the network performance in 
terms of delay caused by the fi ltering process. However, the V6HAPA algorithm 
provides a notably greater effect compared to the standard tunneling, because 
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the V6HAPA algorithm discards any packet containing multi-hop RH2 and 
the RH2 unmatched packets. As a consequence the accuracy of the V6HAPA 
in fi ltering packets consisting RH2 is only about 94%.
Figure 6. Accuracy of Filtering Packets Containing RH0
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Figure 8. The average RH2 packet fi ltering time for V6HAPA algorithm 
CONCLUSION 
Mobile IP security always has a high concern in any internetworking 
environment. It also has special advantages to be implemented in mixed 
environments of MIPv4 and MIPv6. Since there is no compatibility between 
both protocols, the security concern is considered in this paper. V6HAPA, an 
algorithm to secure the HA clients from the attackers who can exploit the IPv6 
RH through bypassing the security fi ltration policies is introduced.
Experimental results using a testbed, demonstrate the ability of the proposed 
algorithm  to detect suspicious packets containing RH0 or RH2 and its accuracy 
in fi ltering such packets without disturbing normal packets containing the 
same headers. In spite of higher fi ltering consumption time, the V6HAPA 
algorithm has a high performance and accuracy in preventing attackers from 
bypassing security fi ltration policies. 
As for future work we consider to extend the capability of V6HAPA in 
handling multi hop routing header type 2 (RH2).
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